• Corpus ID: 246240376

On How Zero-Knowledge Proof Blockchain Mixers Improve, and Worsen User Privacy

  title={On How Zero-Knowledge Proof Blockchain Mixers Improve, and Worsen User Privacy},
  author={Zhipeng Wang and Stefanos Chaliasos and Kaihua Qin and Liyi Zhou and Lifeng Gao and Pascal Berrang and Benjamin Livshits and Arthur Gervais},
One of the most prominent and widely-used blockchain privacy solutions are zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) mixers operating on top of smart contract-enabled blockchains. ZKP mixers typically advertise their level of privacy through a so-called anonymity set size, similar to k-anonymity, where a user hides among a set of k other users. In reality, however, these anonymity set claims are mostly inaccurate, as we find through empirical measurements of the currently most active ZKP mixers. We propose… 
SplitBFT: Improving Byzantine Fault Tolerance Safety Using Trusted Compartments
SplitBFT is presented, a new way to utilize trusted execution technology (TEEs), such as Intel SGX, to harden the safety and confidentiality guarantees of BFT systems, thereby strengthening the trust in could-based deployments of permissioned blockchains.


AMR: autonomous coin mixer with privacy preserving reward distribution
This work proposes to their knowledge the first censorship resilient mixer, which can reward its users in a privacy-preserving manner for participating in the system, and is autonomous as it does not rely on any external server or a third party.
Blockchain is Watching You: Profiling and Deanonymizing Ethereum Users
To the best of the knowledge, this work is the first to propose and implement Ethereum user profiling techniques based on quasi-identifiers and quantitatively compare algorithms in a recent branch of machine learning, the so-called graph representation learning, as well as time-of-day activity and transaction fee baseduser profiling techniques.
An Empirical Analysis of Linkability in the Monero Blockchain
This report empirically evaluates two weaknesses in Monero’s mixin sampling strategy, and proposes and evaluates a countermeasure derived from blockchain data that can improve the privacy of future transactions.
An Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero Blockchain
It is found that after removing mining pool activity, there remains a large amount of potentially privacy-sensitive transactions that are affected by these weaknesses in Monero's mixin sampling strategy and two countermeasures are proposed and evaluated that can improve the privacy of future transactions.
Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin
This paper formulate and construct decentralized anonymous payment schemes (DAP schemes) and builds Zero cash, a practical instantiation of the DAP scheme construction that is orders of magnitude more efficient than the less-anonymous Zero coin and competitive with plain Bit coin.
An Empirical Analysis of Monero Cross-Chain Traceability
A new method is formalized for tracing Monero transactions, which is based on analyzing currency hard forks and suggests that Monero is currently mostly immune to known passive attack vectors and resistant to tracking and tracing methods applied to other cryptocurrencies.
Sybil-Resistant Mixing for Bitcoin
Xim is proposed, a two-party mixing protocol that is compatible with Bitcoin and related virtual currencies, and is the first decentralized protocol to simultaneously address Sybil attackers, denial-of-service attacks, and timing-based inference attacks.
Privacy Aspects and Subliminal Channels in Zcash
This paper studies shielded transactions and shows ways to fingerprint user transactions, including active attacks, and shows presence of efficient 70-bit channels which could be used for tagging of shielded transactions which would allow the attacker to link transactions issued by a maliciously modified zk-SNARK prover.
Möbius: Trustless Tumbling for Transaction Privacy
Möbius achieves strong notions of anonymity, as even malicious senders cannot identify which pseudonyms belong to the recipients to whom they sent money, and is able to resist denial-of-service attacks.
TumbleBit: An Untrusted Bitcoin-Compatible Anonymous Payment Hub
This paper implements TumbleBit, a new unidirectional unlinkable payment hub that is fully compatible with today’s Bitcoin protocol, and proves the security of Tumble Bit using the real/ideal world paradigm and the random oracle model.