On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming

  title={On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming},
  author={Thomas Quint and Jun Wako},
  journal={Math. Oper. Res.},
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preferences allowed. It is well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multivalued. We define a condition on such games called “segmentability”, which means that the set of players can be partitioned into a “top trading segmentation”. It generalizes Gale’s well-known idea of the partition of players into “top trading cycles” (which is used to find the unique strict core… CONTINUE READING


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