On Hardness of Pricing Items for Single-Minded Bidders

@inproceedings{Khandekar2009OnHO,
  title={On Hardness of Pricing Items for Single-Minded Bidders},
  author={Rohit Khandekar and Tracy Kimbrel and Konstantin Makarychev and Maxim Sviridenko},
  booktitle={International Workshop and International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques},
  year={2009}
}
We consider the following item pricing problem which has received much attention recently. A seller has an infinite numbers of copies of n items. There are m buyers, each with a budget and an intention to buy a fixed subset of items. Given prices on the items, each buyer buys his subset of items, at the given prices, provided the total price of the subset is at most his budget. The objective of the seller is to determine the prices such that her total profit is maximized. In this paper, we… 

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