• Corpus ID: 15865277

On Five Deenitions of Data Integrity 1

@inproceedings{Sandhu1993OnFD,
  title={On Five Deenitions of Data Integrity 1},
  author={Ravi S. Sandhu},
  year={1993}
}
This paper compares ve de nitions of data integrity, and shows how they can be ordered in an increasingly restrictive sequence. The most general of these, due to Courtney and Ware [6], is based on the concept of expectation of data quality: data has integrity to the extent that its quality meets, or exceeds, the quality requirements that users expect of it. This de nition incorporates liveness requirements, whereas the others only address safety requirements. The second and third de nitions are… 

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