On Evolutionarily Stable States and Nash Equilibria that Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem

  title={On Evolutionarily Stable States and Nash Equilibria that Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem},
  author={Jiawei Li and Graham Kendall},
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for non-cooperative games, defines all Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games. Here, we prove that Nash equilibria that are not characterised by the folk theorem do exist. By adopting specific reactive strategies, a group of players can be… 
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