On Constitutionalizing a Balanced Budget

  title={On Constitutionalizing a Balanced Budget},
  author={Joe Amick and Terrence L. Chapman and Zachary Elkins},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={1078 - 1096}
Do constitutional rules that mandate a balanced budget promote fiscal discipline? Although such rules are at the heart of austerity debates across the world, we know surprisingly little about their consequences. We leverage original data on constitutional budget provisions and analyze their effect on governments’ primary budget balances. We find that constitutional rules that require balanced budgets are robustly associated with fiscal discipline. The constitutional effect remains even after… Expand
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  • J. Poterba
  • Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
  • 1994
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