On Achieving Leximin Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings

  title={On Achieving Leximin Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings},
  author={Shivika Narang and Arpita Biswas and Y. Narahari},
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is, where agents have to be matched to other agents, has received much less attention. Moreover, two-sided matching literature has largely focused on ordinal preferences. This paper initiates the study of fairness in stable many-to-one matchings under cardinal… 

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