On “seeing” the truth of the Gödel sentence

@article{Boolos1990OnT,
  title={On “seeing” the truth of the G{\"o}del sentence},
  author={George Boolos},
  journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  year={1990},
  volume={13},
  pages={655 - 656}
}
  • G. Boolos
  • Published 1 December 1990
  • Philosophy
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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