• DOI:10.1080/00905992.2011.614224
• Corpus ID: 153850550

Of veto players and entity-voting: institutional gridlock in the Bosnian reform process

@article{BahtiKunrath2011OfVP,
  title={Of veto players and entity-voting: institutional gridlock in the Bosnian reform process},
  author={Birgit Bahti{\'c}-Kunrath},
  journal={Nationalities Papers},
  year={2011},
  volume={39},
  pages={899 - 923}
}

• Birgit Bahtić-Kunrath
• Published 1 November 2011
• Political Science
• Nationalities Papers

Entity-voting in the Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly is a veto mechanism in Bosnia's consociational institutional setting and an important reason for the country's orientation towards the political status quo. An empirical analysis of the number and nature of adopted and rejected draft laws during the legislative period 2006–2010, embedded in George Tsebelis's veto player approach, leads to the conclusion that the veto players in the parliament – either delegates from Republika Srpska or delegates from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – have pushed the consociational system of checks and balances to its extremes. Entity-voting enables the veto players to “hijack” the parliament for their exclusionary ethnic interests and discourages cooperation and compromise between the veto players. Significant legislation, which in the present article is defined as legislation relevant for the European Partnership, faces severe obstacles to getting passed. In the light of these findings, the article discusses three policy implications: institutional redesign, a change of the actors, and an active role of the European Union for providing the actors with a realistically achievable goal which they equally share. This should reset the current calculus of self-interest and encourage cooperation between the veto players.