Occurrent states

  title={Occurrent states},
  author={Gary Bartlett},
  journal={Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={1 - 17}
  • G. Bartlett
  • Published 2 January 2018
  • Philosophy
  • Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Abstract The distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent mental states is frequently appealed to by contemporary philosophers, but it has never been explicated in any significant detail. In the literature, two accounts of the distinction are commonly presupposed (and occasionally stated explicitly). One is that occurrent states are conscious states. The other is that non-occurrent states are dispositional states, and thus that occurrent states are manifestations of dispositions. I argue… 
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