OTHER SOLUTIONS TO NASH'S BARGAINING PROBLEM

@article{Kalai1975OTHERST,
  title={OTHER SOLUTIONS TO NASH'S BARGAINING PROBLEM},
  author={Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky},
  journal={Econometrica},
  year={1975},
  volume={43},
  pages={513-518}
}
A two-person bargaining problem is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution to such a problem. The axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash. Also, families of solutions which satisfy a more limited set of axioms and which are continuous are discussed. WE CONSIDER a two-person bargaining problem mathematically formulated as follows. To every two-person game we associate a pair (a, S), where… 
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A new treatment is presented of a classical economic problem, one which occurs in many forms, as bargaining, bilateral monopoly, etc. It may also be regarded as a nonzero-sum two-person game. In this