ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA

@article{Kohlberg1986ONTS,
  title={ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA},
  author={Elon Kohlberg and Jean-François Mertens},
  journal={Econometrica},
  year={1986},
  volume={54},
  pages={1003-1037}
}
A basic problem in the theory of noncooperative games is the following: which Nash equilibria are strategically stable, i.e. self-enforcing, and does every game have a strategically stable equilibrium? We list three conditions which seem necessary for strategic stabilitybackwards induction, iterated dominance, and invariance-and define a set-valued equilibrium concept that satisfies all three of them. We prove that every game has at least one such equilibrium set. Also, we show that the… Expand
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