ON NORMATIVITY AND EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS: FAILURE OF REPLICATION

@article{Seyedsayamdost2014ONNA,
  title={ON NORMATIVITY AND EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS: FAILURE OF REPLICATION},
  author={Hamid Seyedsayamdost},
  journal={Episteme},
  year={2014},
  volume={12},
  pages={95 - 116}
}
Abstract The field of experimental philosophy has received considerable attention, essentially for producing results that seem highly counter-intuitive and at the same time question some of the fundamental methods used in philosophy. One of the earlier influential papers that gave rise to the experimental philosophy movement titled ‘Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions’ by Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2001), reported that respondents displayed different epistemic… 
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