author={Daron Acemoglu},
  journal={Journal of the European Economic Association},
  • D. Acemoglu
  • Published 1 March 2008
  • Economics
  • Journal of the European Economic Association
This paper develops a model to analyze economic performance under different political regimes. An "oligarchic" society, where political power is in the hands of major producers, protects their property rights but also tends to erect significant entrybarriers against new entrepreneurs. Democracy, where political power is more widely diffused, imposes redistributive taxes on producers, but tends to avoid entry barriers. When taxes in democracy are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers… 

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