Nyāya critique of the Buddhist doctrine of non-soul

@article{Matilal1989NyyaCO,
  title={Nyāya critique of the Buddhist doctrine of non-soul},
  author={Bimal Krishna Matilal},
  journal={Journal of Indian Philosophy},
  year={1989},
  volume={17},
  pages={61-79}
}
  • B. Matilal
  • Published 1 March 1989
  • Philosophy
  • Journal of Indian Philosophy
5 Citations
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The paper gives an account of Rāmakaṇṭha’s (950–1000) contribution to the Buddhist–Brāhmaṇical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground
Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka : a philosophical investigation
This dissertation constitutes a discussion of Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka as contained in his six main philosophical works. It presents a synoptic presentation of the main topics Nagarjuna investigates.

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