Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power

  title={Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power},
  author={Robert Powell},
  journal={International Organization},
  pages={589 - 626}
  • R. Powell
  • Published 11 May 2015
  • Economics
  • International Organization
Abstract An open question in nuclear deterrence theory is whether and how the balance of military power affects the dynamics of escalation. The balance of military strength plays virtually no role in standard accounts of brinkmanship. But this is largely by assumption and seems incompatible with an apparent trade-off between power and risk that decision makers have faced in some actual crises. This paper incorporates this trade-off in a modified model of nuclear brinkmanship. A main result is… 

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