Novel Evidence and Severe Tests

@article{Mayo1991NovelEA,
  title={Novel Evidence and Severe Tests},
  author={Deborah G. Mayo},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  year={1991},
  volume={58},
  pages={523 - 552}
}
  • D. Mayo
  • Published 1 December 1991
  • Art
  • Philosophy of Science
While many philosophers of science have accorded special evidential significance to tests whose results are "novel facts", there continues to be disagreement over both the definition of novelty and why it should matter. The view of novelty favored by Giere, Lakatos, Worrall and many others is that of use-novelty: An accordance between evidence e and hypothesis h provides a genuine test of h only if e is not used in h's construction. I argue that what lies behind the intuition that novelty… 

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