• Corpus ID: 27112789

Nothing in Ethics Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution? Natural Goodnessand Evolutionary Biology

@inproceedings{Odenbaugh2014NothingIE,
  title={Nothing in Ethics Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution? Natural Goodnessand Evolutionary Biology},
  author={Jay Odenbaugh},
  year={2014}
}
Philippa Foot (2001) and Rosalind Hursthouse (1999), along with other philosophers, have argued for a metaethical position, the natural goodness approach, that claims moral evaluations are, or are on a par with, teleological claims made in the biological sciences. Specifically, an organism’s flourishing is characterized by how well they function as specified by the species to which they belong. In this essay, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness approach. Second, I argue that… 

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