Corpus ID: 233864874

Not all Strangers are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games

@article{Kanellopoulos2021NotAS,
  title={Not all Strangers are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games},
  author={P. Kanellopoulos and Maria Kyropoulou and Alexandros A. Voudouris},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2021},
  volume={abs/2105.02699}
}
Schelling’s famous model of segregation assumes agents of di‚erent types, who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the possibility of agents being tolerant towards other agents, even if they are not of the same type. In particular, we consider an ordering of the types, and make the realistic assumption that the agents are in principle more tolerant towards agents of types that… Expand
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