Not-So Hidden Information: Optimal Contracts for Undue Influence in E2E Voting Systems

@inproceedings{Clark2009NotSoHI,
  title={Not-So Hidden Information: Optimal Contracts for Undue Influence in E2E Voting Systems},
  author={Jeremy Clark and Urs Hengartner and Kate Larson},
  booktitle={VOTE-ID},
  year={2009}
}
This paper considers coercion contracts in voting systems with end-to-end (E2E) verifiability. Contracts are a set of instructions that an adversary can dictate to a voter, either through duress or by offering payment, that increase the probability of a compliant voter constructing a vote for the adversary’s preferred candidate. Using a representative E2E system, we place the attacks in game-theoretic terms and study the effectiveness of three proposed contracts from the literature. We offer a… CONTINUE READING
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Hacking Paper: Some Random Attacks on Paper-Based E2E Systems

  • J. Kelsey, A. Regenscheid, T. Moran, D. Chaum
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