Not Propositions

  title={Not Propositions},
  author={Arthur M. Glenberg and David A. Robertson and Jennifer L. Jansen and Mina Johnson-Glenberg},
  journal={Cognitive Systems Research},
Current computational accounts of meaning in the cognitive sciences are based on abstract, amodal symbols (e.g., nodes, links, propositions) that are arbitrarily related to their referents. We argue that such accounts lack convincing empirical support and that they do not provide a satisfactory account for linguistic meaning. One historic set of results supporting the abstract symbol view has come from investigation into comprehension of negated sentences, such as ‘‘The buttons are notsymbol… CONTINUE READING


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