Not Every Object of Thought has Being: A Paradox in Naive Predication Theory

@article{Clark1978NotEO,
  title={Not Every Object of Thought has Being: A Paradox in Naive Predication Theory},
  author={R. Clark},
  journal={No{\^u}s},
  year={1978},
  volume={12},
  pages={181}
}
Naive set theory with an unqualified axiom specifying the existence of sets is contradictory as Russell showed. So too certain theories of predication resting on plausible, intuitive principles are contradictory if those principles are not in some way qualified or if restrictions are not imposed on standard inferential steps. This can be shown by an argument analogous to that of Russell with respect to the Abstraction Axiom of naive set theory. Just as Russell's argument has philosophical… Expand
23 Citations
Worlds and Propositions Set Free
  • 9
  • PDF
Philosophical Method and The Theory of Predication and Identity
  • 14
  • Highly Influenced
Modal Meinongianism, Russell’s Paradox, and the Language/Metalanguage Distinction
  • PDF
MECHANIZING PRINCIPIA LOGICO-METAPHYSICA IN FUNCTIONAL TYPE-THEORY
  • 12
  • Highly Influenced
  • PDF
Meinongian theories and a russellian paradox
  • 121
  • PDF
To Be and Not To Be
  • 5
  • PDF
...
1
2
3
...

References

SHOWING 1-2 OF 2 REFERENCES
Thinking and the structure of the world
  • 121
Identity and sameness
  • 48