Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality ∗

@inproceedings{Yalcin2008NonfactualismAE,
  title={Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality ∗},
  author={Seth Yalcin},
  year={2008}
}
When I tell you that it’s raining, I describe a way the world is—viz., rainy. I say something factual, something whose truth turns on how things are with some aspect of the world. Likewise when I tell you that the weatherman thinks that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I say turns on a different feature of the world, namely, the weatherman’s state of mind. Likewise when I tell you that I think that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I say turns on yet another feature of the world, namely… CONTINUE READING