Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate

  title={Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate},
  author={Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm},
Aggregating the preferences of self-interested agents is a key problem for multiagent systems, and one general method for doing so is to vote over the alternatives (candidates). Unfortunately, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that when there are three or more candidates, all reasonable voting rules are manipulable (in the sense that there exist situations in which a voter would benefit from reporting its preferences insincerely). To circumvent this impossibility result, recent research… CONTINUE READING
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