Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference

@article{Raftopoulos2006NonconceptualDR,
  title={Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference},
  author={Athanassios Raftopoulos and Vincent C. M{\"u}ller},
  journal={Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  year={2006},
  volume={72},
  pages={251-285}
}
The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is… 
Nonconceptual Content and Demonstrative Strategies
In speaking of Demonstrative Strategy (DS), we may have two different things in mind. First, we can mean that demonstratives constitute and organize logi-cal-linguistic activity. Zenon Pylyshyn
Reference, perception, and attention
TLDR
Although Campbell’s claim that the determination of the reference of a perceptual demonstrative requires conscious visual object-based selective attention is examined, it is argued that although this binding parameter does not require object- based attention for its construction, it would necessarily involve the application of sortal concepts.
Perceptual systems and realism
TLDR
It is claimed first that nonconceptual content is the appropriate level of analysis of the issue of realism since it avoids the main problems besetting various types of analysis the issue at the level of beliefs about the world.
PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM
Demonstrative thoughts are distinguished by the fact that their contents are determined relationally, via perception, rather than descriptively. Therefore, a fundamental task of a theory of
Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought?
TLDR
This paper synthesizes three central proponents of this approach (Evans, Recanati, and Dickie) and shows that the epistemic conditions they place on perception-based demonstrative thought are not actually required.
Relational Construction of Visual Objects
One of the main functions of the visual system is to construct representations of objects. These "visual objects" are formed by developing the structure of more primitive visual representations. In
The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness
In this paper, I claim that since (a) there is a cognitively impenetrable (CI) stage of visual perception, namely early vision, and (b) cognitive penetrability (CP) and theory-ladenness are
Cognitive Penetration Lite and Nonconceptual Content
Abstract The Macpherson (Philos Phenomenol Res 84(1):24–62, 2012) argued that the perceptual experience of colors is cognitively penetrable (CP). Macpherson also thinks that perception has
Can nonconceptual content be stored in visual memory?
TLDR
This paper argues against the claim that NCC can be stored in VSTM, and offers four reasons why NCC cannot be stores in visual memory and why only conceptual information can.
Late Vision: Processes and Epistemic Status
TLDR
It is argued that although late vision implicates beliefs, either implicit or explicit, these beliefs are hybrid visual/conceptual constructs and not pure thoughts, and the specification of the epistemology of late vision lays the ground for attacking that problem.
...
1
2
3
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 55 REFERENCES
The phenomenal content of experience
Abstract:  We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved
Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons”
In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans (1982) argues that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual, in a sense I shall explain momentarily.1 More recently, in his book Mind and
Sense, Reference and Selective Attention
he idea that there is a distinction between propositional and Ti magistic content is familiar and compelling, but it brings with it a problem. The problem is to explain the relation between the two
The reviewing of object files: Object-specific integration of information
Principles of Object Perception
TLDR
Findings suggest that a general representation of object unity and boundaries is interposed between representations of surfaces and representations of objects of familiar kinds, related to processes of physical reasoning.
Defending Realism on the Proper Ground
‘Epistemological constructivism’ holds that vision is mediated by background preconceptions and is theory-laden. Hence, two persons with differing theoretical commitments see the world differently
Visual Attention and the Perception of Features and Objects
Feature integration theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) suggested that simple features are codel in parallel in a number of specialized feature maps, but that focussed attention is required to ensure
Word and Object
TLDR
This edition offers a new preface by Quine's student and colleague Dagfinn Follesdal that describes the never-realized plans for a second edition of Word and Object, in which Quine would offer a more unified treatment of the public nature of meaning, modalities, and propositional attitudes.
Understanding Demonstratives
It has recently been claimed that the use of demonstrative or indexical expressions like 'today', 'yesterday', 'here', T, 'you', 'this', etc., resists incorporation into a Fregean theory of meaning.
Making it explicit : reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment
What would something unlike us - a computer, for example - have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower, like us? To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves,
...
1
2
3
4
5
...