Non-state order and strategic communication via symbolic dress in Yemen

  title={Non-state order and strategic communication via symbolic dress in Yemen},
  author={Daniel Corstange},
  journal={Rationality and Society},
  pages={3 - 51}
How do people keep order in weak states? Formal institutions provide law and order in rich societies, but are feeble and capricious in much of the developing world. Instead, people turn to informal, group-based order that operates through reputation and contingent cooperation. Such order requires people to police social boundaries and contributions, looking for costly signals of membership and commitment to weed out mimics and shirkers. Data from Yemen show that people rely on tribes for… Expand

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