Non-qualitative Properties

  title={Non-qualitative Properties},
  author={Sam Cowling},
The distinction between qualitative properties like mass and shape and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and being next to Obama is important, but remains largely unexamined. After discussing its theoretical significance and cataloguing various kinds of non-qualitative properties, I survey several views about the nature of this distinction and argue that all proposed reductive analyses of this distinction are unsatisfactory. I then defend primitivism, according to which the… 
Fundamental non-qualitative properties
It is argued that the class of non-qualitative properties is broader than it is often taken to be and will not only include properties such as being identical to Castor, which somehow make reference to particular individuals, but will also include more general propertiessuch as identity, composition, set membership, as well as various peculiarly ontological properties.
Impure concepts and non-qualitative properties
It is argued that this linguistic thesis fails in both directions: there might be non-qualitative properties that can be designated descriptively without the aid of directly referential devices (such as demonstratives, indexicals, or proper names).
Qualitative properties and relations
This paper is concerned with two concepts of qualitativeness that apply to intensional entities (i.e., properties, relations, and states of affairs). I propose an account of pure qualitativeness that
Could Charge and Mass be Universals?
  • M. J. Gilton
  • Philosophy
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
  • 2020
Many issues in metaphysics and philosophy of science concern the status, significance, or theoretical role of properties such as charge and mass. This paper is about the surprising differences in
Recombining non-qualitative reality
Haecceitism and Hume’s Dictum are each controversial theses about necessity and possibility. According to haecceitism, there are qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds that differ only with
Symmetry, indiscernibility, and the generalist picture
This thesis consists of four independent but thematically interrelated papers, plus an addendum to one of these papers. Chapter 1 defends the view that Leibniz subscribed to generalism, or the view
Challenging the identity theory of properties
The Identity Theory of properties (IDT) is an increasingly popular metaphysical view that aims to be a middle way between pure powerism and pure categoricalism. This paper’s goal is to highlight
Arbitrary grounding
The aim of this paper is to introduce, elucidate and defend the usefulness of a variant of grounding, or metaphysical explanation, that has the feature that the grounds explain of some states of
Anti-Haecceitism and Fundamentality
Is everything about reality either qualitative or somehow determined by the qualitative character of reality itself? Metaphysical anti-Haecceitism is often taken to be the claim that this is the
Conceivability arguments for haecceitism
It is concluded that there is no irresistible conceivability argument for haecceitism even while anti-haecceitist responses do come with certain notable commitments.


Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality
The standard counterexamples to David Lewis’s account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to
Armstrong on Quantities and Resemblance
Resemblances obtain not only between objects but between properties. Resemblances of the latter sort – in particular resemblances between quantitative properties – prove to be the downfall of a
Do object-dependent properties threaten physicalism?
In his paper ?Supervenience and object-dependent properties?, Thomas Hofweber argues that the thesis of direct reference is incompatible with physicalism: the claim that the non-physical supervenes
Global Supervenience and Dependence
Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. 1 introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one
Property Counterparts and Natural Class Trope Nominalism
'Natural class' trope nominalism makes a trope's being of a certain sort--its nature--a matter of its membership in a certain natural class of actual tropes. It has been objected that on this theory
Isolation and unification: The realist analysis of possible worlds
Examinant le realisme mereologique des mondes possibles developpe par D. Lewis, l'A. introduit les notions d'isolation et unifcation dans le problemes des mondes logiquement unifies. Rejetant la
Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity
Is the world—and are all possible worlds—constituted by purely qualitative facts, or does thisness hold a place beside suchness as a fundamental feature of reality? Some famous philosophers—Leibniz,
Tropes, necessary connections, and non-transferability
In this paper I examine whether the Humean denial of necessary connections between wholly distinct contingent existents poses problems for a theory of tropes. In section one I consider the
Haecceitism for Modal Realists
In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re
Identity and Indiscernibility
Putative counterexamples to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) are notoriously inconclusive. I establish ground rules for debate in this area, offer a new response to such