Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods

@inproceedings{Hassidim2011NonpriceEI,
  title={Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods},
  author={Avinatan Hassidim and Haim Kaplan and Y. Mansour and N. Nisan},
  booktitle={EC '11},
  year={2011}
}
  • Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, +1 author N. Nisan
  • Published in EC '11 2011
  • Computer Science, Economics, Mathematics
  • We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items, and where the highest bidder on an item wins it and pays his bid. We first observe that pure Nash-equilibria of this game excatly correspond to price-based equilibiria (and thus need not exist), but that mixed-Nash equilibria always do exist, and we analyze… CONTINUE READING

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    Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
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    • Highly Influential
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