• Corpus ID: 153312285

Non-malleability for quantum public-key encryption

@article{Majenz2019NonmalleabilityFQ,
  title={Non-malleability for quantum public-key encryption},
  author={Christian Majenz and Christian Schaffner and Jeroen van Wier},
  journal={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
  year={2019},
  volume={2019},
  pages={496}
}
Non-malleability is an important security property for public-key encryption (PKE). Its significance is due to the fundamental unachievability of integrity and authenticity guarantees in this setting, rendering it the strongest integrity-like property achievable using only PKE, without digital signatures. In this work, we generalize this notion to the setting of quantum public-key encryption. Overcoming the notorious "recording barrier" known from generalizing other integrity-like security… 
1 Citations

Weak approximate unitary designs and applications to quantum encryption

This work gives a partially derandomized construction of a quantum encryption scheme that has roughly the same key size and security as the quantum one-time pad, but possesses the additional property of being non-malleable against adversaries without quantum side information.

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