Non-cooperative games

  title={Non-cooperative games},
  author={Eric van Damme},
  • E. Damme
  • Published 1 October 2000
  • Economics
  • Top
We describe non-cooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution concepts. Some applications are also noted. Conventional theory focuses on the question ‘how will rational players play?’, and has the Nash equilibrium at its core. We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as well as refinements (perfect and stable equilibria) and relaxations (rationalizability and correlated equilibria). Motivated by experiments that show systematic theory violations, behavioral game theory… 

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