Non-computable strategies and discounted repeated games

@article{Nachbar1996NoncomputableSA,
  title={Non-computable strategies and discounted repeated games},
  author={John H. Nachbar and William R. Zame},
  journal={Economic Theory},
  year={1996},
  volume={8},
  pages={103-122}
}
SummaryA number of authors have used formal models of computation to capture the idea of “bounded rationality” in repeated games. Most of this literature has used computability by a finite automaton as the standard. A conceptual difficulty with this standard is that the decision problem is not “closed.” That is, for every strategy implementable by an automaton, there is some best response implementable by an automaton, but there may not exist any algorithm forfinding such a best response that… CONTINUE READING

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