Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games

@article{Cohen2011NonclairvoyantSG,
  title={Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games},
  author={Johanne Cohen and Christoph D{\"u}rr and Nguyen Kim Thang},
  journal={Theory of Computing Systems},
  year={2011},
  volume={49},
  pages={3-23}
}
In a scheduling game, each player owns a job and chooses a machine to execute it. While the social cost is the maximal load over all machines (makespan), the cost (disutility) of each player is the completion time of its own job. In the game, players may follow selfish strategies to optimize their cost and therefore their behaviors do not necessarily lead the game to an equilibrium. Even in the case there is an equilibrium, its makespan might be much larger than the social optimum, and this… CONTINUE READING

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