Corpus ID: 7409755

Non-Revelation Mechanism Design

@article{Hartline2016NonRevelationMD,
  title={Non-Revelation Mechanism Design},
  author={Jason D. Hartline and Samuel Taggart},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2016},
  volume={abs/1608.01875}
}
  • Jason D. Hartline, Samuel Taggart
  • Published 2016
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • ArXiv
  • We consider mechanism design and redesign for markets like Internet advertising where many frequent, small transactions are organized by a principal. Mechanisms for these markets rarely have truthtelling equilibria. We identify a family of winner-pays-bid mechanisms for such markets that exhibit three properties. First, equilibria in these mechanisms are simple. Second, the mechanisms' parameters are easily reoptimized from the bid data that the mechanism generates. Third, the performance of… CONTINUE READING

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