Non-Executive Incentives and Bank Risk-Taking Viral
@inproceedings{Acharya2013NonExecutiveIA, title={Non-Executive Incentives and Bank Risk-Taking Viral}, author={Acharya and C. Starr}, year={2013} }
Motivated by recent theoretical work, in this paper we empirically investigate (i) the determinants of nonexecutive compensation policies in U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) and (ii) the impact of such policies on BHCs’ risk-taking. To this end, we develop a measure of non-executive compensation incentives based on the elasticity of BHC compensation–net of executive pay–to BHC performance. We find that BHCs with higher nonexecutive compensation elasticity before the financial crisis exhibited… CONTINUE READING
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