Non-Equilibrium Play in Centipede Games ∗

  title={Non-Equilibrium Play in Centipede Games ∗},
  author={Bernardo Gar{\'c}ıa-Pola and Nagore Iriberri and Jaromı́r Kov{\'a}ř́ık},
  • Bernardo Garćıa-Pola, Nagore Iriberri, Jaromı́r Kovář́ık
  • Published 2017
Centipede games represent a classic example of a strategic situation, where the equilibrium prediction is at odds with human behavior. This study is explicitly designed to discriminate among the proposed explanations for initial responses in Centipede games. Using many different Centipede games, our approach determines endogenously whether one or more… CONTINUE READING