• DOI:10.1007/s11229-019-02528-8
Corpus ID: 211088652

No commitment to the truth

@article{Eder2020NoCT,
  title={No commitment to the truth},
  author={Anna-Maria A. Eder},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2020},
  pages={1-24}
}

Anna-Maria A. Eder

Published 2020

Philosophy

Synthese

On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this article is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only… CONTINUE READING

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