No Substitute for the "P" Word in Financial Rescue

@article{Ausubel2009NoSF,
  title={No Substitute for the "P" Word in Financial Rescue},
  author={Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton},
  journal={The Economists' Voice},
  year={2009},
  volume={6}
}
Fears of pricing troubled assets have needlessly stalled the rescue effort, according to Lawrence Ausubel and Peter Cramton, two market-design economists whose work on TARP has received the attention of the Treasury and policy makers. 
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