Newcomb’s problem and its conditional evidence: a common cause of confusion

@article{Burgess2010NewcombsPA,
  title={Newcomb’s problem and its conditional evidence: a common cause of confusion},
  author={Simon Burgess},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2010},
  volume={184},
  pages={319-339}
}
  • S. Burgess
  • Published 1 February 2012
  • Philosophy
  • Synthese
This paper aims to make three contributions to decision theory. First there is the hope that it will help to re-establish the legitimacy of the problem, pace various recent analyses provided by Maitzen and Wilson, Slezak and Priest. Second, after pointing out that analyses of the problem have generally relied upon evidence that is conditional on the taking of one particular option, this paper argues that certain assumptions implicit in those analyses are subtly flawed. As a third contribution… 
A typology of Newcomblike problems
This paper introduces a typology of Newcomblike problems—decision problems in which evidential decision theory and causal decision theory come apart. Such problems involve an evidential dependence
Realizing Newcomb's Problem
Richard Jeffrey (1983, 23) said that Newcomb’s Problem may be seen “as a rock on which ... Bayesianism ... must founder” and the problem has been almost universally conceived as reconciling the
Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem
It is intuitively attractive to think that it makes a difference in Newcomb’s problem whether or not the predictor is infallible, in the sense of being certainly actually correct. This paper argues
A Complete Bibliography of Publications in Synthese, 2020–2029
Abduction [336]. Abductive [11, 124]. ability [143]. Absence [188]. absences [233]. absurdity [154]. Acceptable [18]. accepting [120]. account [81, 169, 129, 13, 196, 168]. across [35]. Action [271,

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 23 REFERENCES
Demons, Deceivers And Liars: Newcomb’s Malin Génie
A fully adequate solution to Newcomb’s Problem (Nozick 1969) should reveal the source of its extraordinary elusiveness and persistent intractability. Recently, a few accounts have independently
Newcomb's Problem as Cognitive Illusion
Newcomb’s Problem as Cognitive Illusion Peter Slezak (p.slezak@unsw.edu.au) Program in Cognitive Science School of History & Philosophy of Science University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW 2052,
Newcomb's Hidden Regress
Newcomb's problem supposedly involves your choosing one or else two boxes in circumstances in which a predictor has made a prediction of how many boxes you will choose. We argue that the
Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice
TLDR
A being in whose power to predict your choices you have enormous confidence leads you to believe that almost certainly this being’s prediction about your choice in the situation to be discussed will be correct.
Causal decision theory
TLDR
My own version of causal decision theory is given, compared with versions offered by several other authors, and it is suggested that the versions have more in common than meets the eye.
Does Practical Deliberation Crowd Out Self-Prediction?
It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to
The Newcomb Problem: An Unqualified Resolution
TLDR
The evidence unequivocally supports two-boxing as therational option and the principle of dominance is thus inperfect harmony with the conventional conditionalexpected outcomes.
Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One's Own Actions
Isaac Levi has long criticized causal decisiontheory on the grounds that it requiresdeliberating agents to make predictions abouttheir own actions. A rational agent cannot, heclaims, see herself as
The Covenant of Reason - Rationality and the Commitments of Thought
TLDR
This chapter discusses Bayesianism as shared agreement and outcome of inquiry, Rationality, prediction and autonomous choice, and the paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg.
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
TLDR
A chance to reconsider Prudential rationality as expected utility maximization as well as a representation theorem for causal decision theory.
...
1
2
3
...