New results on the verification of Nash refinements for extensive-form games

@inproceedings{Gatti2012NewRO,
  title={New results on the verification of Nash refinements for extensive-form games},
  author={Nicola Gatti and Fabio Panozzo},
  booktitle={AAMAS},
  year={2012}
}
The computational study of strategic interaction situations has recently deserved a lot of attention in multi–agent systems. A number of results on strategic–form games and zero–sum extensive–form games are known in the literature, while general–sum extensive–form games are not studied in depth. We focus on the problem to decide whether or not a solution is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium (NE) for extensive–form games. Refinements are needed because the NE concept is not satisfactory for… CONTINUE READING

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