New physicians: a natural experiment in market organization

@article{Roth1990NewPA,
  title={New physicians: a natural experiment in market organization},
  author={A. Roth},
  journal={Science},
  year={1990},
  volume={250},
  pages={1524 - 1528}
}
  • A. Roth
  • Published 1990
  • Business, Medicine
  • Science
The National Resident Matching Program is a centralized clearinghouse through which new medical graduates in the United States obtain their first positions. The history of this market, from the market failures that the centralized system was designed to address, to the present, is discussed, and a hypothesis about the behavior of such markets is presented. New evidence is then presented from a set of similar centralized markets in the United Kingdom. Because some of these latter markets have… Expand

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It is shown that, for a suitable ordering, the set of stable matchings is a lattice, and the matching problem for firms and workers is continued. Expand
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