• Corpus ID: 17777351

New directions in mechanism design

  title={New directions in mechanism design},
  author={Jiangtao Meng},
  • J. Meng
  • Published 21 December 2005
  • Computer Science
  • ArXiv
Mechanism design uses the tools of economics and game theory to design rules of interaction for economic transactions that will,in principle, yield some de- sired outcome. In the last few years this field has received much interest of researchers in computer science, especially with the Internet developing as a platform for communications and connections among enormous numbers of computers and humans. Arguably the most positive result in mechanism de- sign is truthful and there are only one… 

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