New Candidates Welcome! Possible Winners with respect to the Addition of New Candidates

@article{Chevaleyre2012NewCW,
  title={New Candidates Welcome! Possible Winners with respect to the Addition of New Candidates},
  author={Y. Chevaleyre and J. Lang and N. Maudet and J. Monnot and Lirong Xia},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2012},
  volume={abs/1111.3690}
}
In voting contexts, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that a fixed number k of new candidates will be added. We give a computational study of this problem, focusing on scoring rules, and we provide a formal comparison with related problems such as control via adding candidates or cloning. 
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In some voting situations, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that aExpand
Possible winners when new alternatives join: new results coming up!
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