Neumann's and Morgenstern's New Approach to Static Economics

@article{Marschak1946NeumannsAM,
  title={Neumann's and Morgenstern's New Approach to Static Economics},
  author={Jacob Marschak},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={1946},
  volume={54},
  pages={97 - 115}
}
  • J. Marschak
  • Published 1 April 1946
  • Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
A LL is not well with static economics. True, the case of a single consumer or producer, assumed to maximize expected utility or expected money profit, with risk and uncertainty properly accounted for, seems to have been analyzed rather completely and consistently. The more significant implications of this analysis (e.g., the famous Slutsky equation) have not yet been subjected to valid verification by facts; but neither have they been disproved. It is quite different with the analysis of… 

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