Networks, Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation

@article{Caplan2003NetworksLA,
  title={Networks, Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation},
  author={Bryan Caplan and Edward Peter Stringham},
  journal={The Review of Austrian Economics},
  year={2003},
  volume={16},
  pages={309-326}
}
There is a tension between libertarians' optimism about private supply of public goods and skepticism of the viability of voluntary collusion (Cowen 1992, Cowen and Sutter 1999). Playing off this asymmetry, Cowen (1992) advances the novel argument that the “free market in defense services” favored by anarcho-capitalists is a network industry where collusion is especially feasible. The current article dissolves Cowen's asymmetry, showing that he fails to distinguish between self-enforcing and… 
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