Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results

  title={Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results},
  author={Tanmoy Chakraborty and Michael Kearns and Sanjeev Khanna},
We consider models for bargaining in social networks, in which players are represented by vertices and edges represent bilateral opportunities for deals between pairs of players. Each deal yields some fixed wealth if its two players can agree on how to divide it; otherwise it yields no wealth. In such a setting, Chakraborty and Kearns (WINE 2008) introduced a simple axiomatic model that stipulates an equilibrium concept in which all players are rationally satisfied with their shares. We further… CONTINUE READING
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