Corpus ID: 30363654

Network Creation Games: Structure vs Anarchy

@article{lvarez2017NetworkCG,
  title={Network Creation Games: Structure vs Anarchy},
  author={C. {\`A}lvarez and A. Messegu{\'e}},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2017},
  volume={abs/1706.09132}
}
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classical model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a prefixed price $\alpha>0$ in order to get connected to the network formed by all the $n$ agents. In this setting, the reformulated tree conjecture states that for $\alpha > n$, every Nash equilibrium network is a tree. Since it was shown that the price of anarchy for trees is constant, if the tree conjecture were true… Expand

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