Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics

  title={Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics},
  author={George Tsebelis},
List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgments 1. Nested Games and Rationality 2. In Defense of the Rational-Choice Approach Appendix to Chapter 2 3. Two-Person Games with Variable Payoffs Appendix to Chapter 3: A Appendix to Chapter 3: B 4* Games with Variable Rules, or the Politics of Institutional Change 5. Why Do British Labour Party Activists Commit Political Suicide? Appendix to Chapter 5 6. A Rational-Choice Approach to Consociationalism 7. The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions… 
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