• DOI:10.1162/0162288041588296
• Corpus ID: 57559356

Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States

@article{Fearon2004NeotrusteeshipAT,
  title={Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States},
  author={James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin},
  journal={International Security},
  year={2004},
  volume={28},
  pages={5-43}
}

• J. Fearon, D. Laitin
• Published 21 May 2004
• Political Science
• International Security

his administration came into oface with a self-consciously realist orientation in foreign policy. The president and his advisers derided the Clinton administration’s multilateralism as mere form without national security substance. They viewed Russia and China as the main potential threats or sources of danger, and regarded Bill Clinton as a naive idealist for neglecting these great powers in favor of “foreign policy as social work”—humanitarian ventures in areas peripheral to U.S. national security concerns.1 Consistent with a realist suspicion of multilateralism and conadence in self-help, the administration’s principal foreign policy project in its arst months was the unilateral pursuit of ballistic missile defense. The Bush team was particularly critical of U.S. participation in quixotic efforts at nation building for failed states. As a candidate, Vice President Dick Cheney created a signiacant oap in August 2000 when he suggested that the Bush administration would end U.S. participation in NATO’s Bosnia mission.2 Condoleezza Rice, who would become Bush’s national security adviser, expressed dismayed amazement that U.S. troops were being used to take children to kindergarten in Bosnia.3 The message was clear: The Bush administration would not engage in state-building efforts.4