• Corpus ID: 142657771

Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory

  title={Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory},
  author={W. Teed Rockwell},
  • W. Rockwell
  • Published 12 August 2005
  • Philosophy, Psychology
In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory -- which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" (distinct from… 
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