Negotiating Through an Agent

@article{Lax1991NegotiatingTA,
  title={Negotiating Through an Agent},
  author={David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  year={1991},
  volume={35},
  pages={474 - 493}
}
Agents often bargain on behalf of their principals. In many common negotiating situations, especially where ex post ratification of the agent's agreement is required (e.g., union contracts, treaties), an agent faces inherent uncertainty about the terms that are minimally acceptable to the principal (the principal's “reservation price”). In fact, the agent's entire payoff function may be uncertain. We study bargaining behavior in these circumstances and show that the agent's minimum demands… 

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